Hegelian dialectics was possibly sublated by marx, but Marx's dialectic is not a dialectic idea but a material world which does exist as a basic assumption that is perfect for any theory which intends to be useful. You cannot sublate the material world itself. But again, I think that you are under the impression that, because you thought of a quick gotcha, that this hasn't already been thought about and written by many scholars before you. Hegel himself saw this gotcha coming

[–] barsoap@lemm.ee 1 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 children)

Nah I'm just confused by the way you reacted to me saying "I'm not a Hegelian", apparently completely dismissing cybernetics as a framework even though it can very much express Hegelian thought. It's not like I said "I'm a seventh day adventist and all your arguments shall be in the form of bible quotes or they're invalid" or something like that.

As far as I am concerned, regarding choice of base formalism other people use: Do whatever. If need be I'll find the corresponding isomorphism in what I'm comfortable with, make the argument, project it back into your formalism, then say it out aloud. Coming to think of it when I put it like this my basic model might actually be category theory. Choice of formalism is very much a matter of convenience, and cybernetics happens to be darn convenient for pretty much everything, and has very important insights of its own to contribute.

I'm not read in Hegel and Hegelians so I'm asking you, do they talk about things like branching growth at the penultimate level following MSTs/sublation? It certainly neatly explains e.g. the increase in number in different erm sects both on the left and right following the initial clashes, in the sense that a sublation already exists and is exerting control, is in the process of getting refined as it is refining the old thesis-antithesis pair by deconstructing both.

(And yes I just called "left unity" anti-Hegelian, deal with it :)

[–] commiewithoutorgans@hexbear.net 1 points 1 year ago (1 children)

I dismissed cybernetics as a way to supplant the need for an underlying philosophy, which is what you were doing at the beginning. You can study cybernetics and believe it's supported by dialectics, but the other way is nonsense. I am in no way dismissing that MST s are another way to talk about dialectical movements, but it is not dealing with the essence of a thing or that thing in itself at the level of philosophy. Hegelians talk about similar things very often, with a lot of the examples on the pages shown being almost identical in form to things Engels pointed out. But saying you're not a Hegelian (we mean dialectician here, you're likely not a marxist either) indicates to me that our disagreement is not at the level of cybernetics, but at the level of what causes such interactions at all

[–] barsoap@lemm.ee 1 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago)

the essence of a thing or that thing in itself

I'd contend that both are actually the same thing. However that's metaphysics which I have a severe dislike for (as in: it's pointless) so maybe that's why I lump it all up in one thing, and in any case, however that may be: You will find neither of them in any model, anywhere. It's the very nature of a model to not be the thing itself.

I'm quite sure you'll say "yes" when I ask whether you understand the difference between map and territory. Is that understanding you have of that, however, on the level of the map, or on the level of the territory?

Those are the actually tough nuts to crack when rooting models, when fishing for axioms to ground things with. To understand the shape of the wall Plato's shadows get cast on, so that you know how the structure of the wall influences their shape, to be a giant iota closer to understanding.

It would, indeed, be a shame if being a Hegelian meant regressing the "know thyself" aspect to far behind what the Stoics had already figured out in spades.

indicates to me that our disagreement is not at the level of cybernetics, but at the level of what causes such interactions at all

Is that important? Is it not more important to identify and characterise interactions? Physicists with different beliefs about the ultimate mechanics of quantum uncertainty get along just fine. Personally, as already alluded to with metaphysics, I'm happy to say "yeah whatever causes that, causes that", I have no need or desire for distinctions beyond the measurable.